Target killings offset battlefield losses, undermine govt

by Shamindra Ferdinando

VICTOR IVAN, Editor of Ravaya, in an exclusive interview with C.A. Chandraprema, on the current state of the ethnic conflict, briefly touched on the security situation. Describing the seizure of the strategic Elephant Pass in April 2000 and the devastating assault on the Bandaranaike International Airport as ‘very great military victories’, the veteran political commentator expressed belief that the recent attacks on VIPs moving in vehicles signalled the failure of their military strategy. He asserted that killings of individuals (target killings) indicated the weakening of their position Vis a Vis the State.

"The LTTE captured Elephant Pass. This was a very great military victory. They attacked the Katunayake Airport, which was also a great military victory. If from that point they were unable transform those victories into a solution, and then their whole campaign can be deemed to have been unsuccessful. There are no big targets left to attack. If a military campaign goes up to the highest level and then comes down to the level of targeting the cars and jeeps of VIPs, that is a clear indication that their campaign is unsuccessful," Chandraprema quoted Ivan in the editorial-page article in the December 15 issue of The Island.

Aren’t there any more big targets? Did recent attacks on VIPs suggest collapse of their military campaign dubbed the Eelam War IV? I don’t frankly think so.

LTTE strategy

It would be suicidal on the part of President Mahinda Rajapakse’s government to presume such an eventuality. The State must prudently assess the LTTE’s strength and weakness. A comprehensive appraisal would help President Mahinda Rajapakse to act wisely without being lulled into a false sense of security. Ivan is spot on. There is no doubt that the LTTE had been weakened, both here and overseas. But I don’t subscribe to the theory that attacks on cars and jeeps (carrying political and military leaders) indicate a gradual deteriorating of their prowess. In fact, it is part of their repeatedly proven strategy of a campaign parallel to conventional military operations. Their two-pronged strategy had been devastating. It facilitated their progress as successive governments struggled.

Ivan’s assessment came in the backdrop of half a dozen attacks on top government officials. Although assassins failed to achieve their goals in some instances the overall impact had been devastating. They felled Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August last year. The government reacted hesitantly. Kumaratunga’s administration assured its commitment to the Oslo-arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). Major Mutalif and Colonel Meedin both of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) died in attacks in Colombo. Although the LTTE mounted a series of claymore mine attacks on the military, President Rajapakse did not hit back. The President ordered retaliatory strikes only after a woman assassin infiltrated Army Headquarters and attacked Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, the first officer to be targeted inside a service headquarters in the Eelam war. It was a brazen act of terrorism. Although some political parties wrongly asserted the attack as a cowardly act, I beg to disagree with them. From their point of view it had been a brilliant coup and the subsequent revelation that the LTTE had infiltrated the army, devastated the government. The arrest of several persons including two Majors revealed the existence of traitors. I would not repeat the charges against them but the fact that the attack on President Rajapakse’s brother and Defence Secretary Colonel Gotabhaya Rajapakse (retd.) may have been facilitated by an army informant is frightening. Is the infiltrator still active? It is no secret that the two Majors (read traitors) were in police custody at the time a Tamil disguised as a Muslim targeted Rajapakse’s bullet proof car near Temple Trees. Subsequent inquiries revealed that the assassin had a genuine National Identity Card (NIC) issued by the Department of Registrar of Persons. Remember, even the woman suicide cadre, who targeted EPDP leader and Minister Douglas Devananda, a few years ago, carried a NIC. She had been employed by a UNP politician as servant until she put on the suicide jacket. Although Devananda survived she exploded herself at the Kollupitiya police.

Professional hits

Did anyone consider the assassination of Vice Admiral Clancy Fernando, a true strategist who played a critical role in the blockade on the Jaffna peninsula, a sign of weakness? An assassin targeted Fernando’s unescorted car near Navy Headquarters in November 1992. The assassination of Sri Lanka Minister for Defence Ranjan Wijeratne, Ranasinghe Premadasa, Lalith Athulathmudali or Gamini Dissanayake could not be a sign of weakness.

Their targets are not ordinary men. They target the politicians and officers responsible for the war effort and anyone who could threaten their despicable strategies. In some cases assassinations are aimed at fuelling political uncertainty and chaos. During its second insurgency the JVP successfully practiced this. Although it didn’t have the military capability to overrun any army base, it virtually brought President Premadasa to his knees through a campaign of target killings and indiscriminate destruction of public and private property. Neutralising a key target in his or her home base would undermine the stability.

The government too carried out target killings. During the tail end of Chandrika Kumaratunga’s administration, the military through a variety of means targeted LTTE leaders in their home base. Operations conducted by deep penetration units unsettled the LTTE leadership. The breakaway Karuna faction practiced what it knows best.

A key element in LTTE strategy

The bottom line is that assassinations, whether here or abroad, are not a sign of weakness and in no way should be considered as such. Assassinations are part of their strategy to reinforce the overall plan, particularly in the event of setbacks on the battlefield. A successful attack on Gotabhaya Rajapakse would have offset their recent battlefield reversals. The LTTE mounted the assassination bid amidst the ongoing battle for Vakarai. His assassination would have delivered a double blow. It would have shattered President Rajapakse and undermined the combined security forces campaign against the LTTE. Despite two reversals, the October 11 debacle suffered by the army at Muhamalai and the massacre of SLN personnel at Diganpathana, which I believe could have been averted, security forces had inflicted sizeable losses on the LTTE.

The LTTE on November 27 admitted that it lost 818 cadres including 250 women. It did not release the number of wounded cadres. Although the loss of 818 from January 1 to November 10 this year is relatively low, when compared with their previous losses in a calendar year, other factors had made this year’s losses devastating. I believe that the LTTE suffered most of its losses during the assault on the army’s Jaffna frontlines beginning August 11. Despite suffering an initial setback, the army fought back and by the first week of September brought the enemy’s first line of fortifications under its control. Although the victory did not come cheap, troops proved that they would courageously meet the challenge. If troops gave in to heavy pressure the Jaffna frontline from Kilali extending upto Nagarkovil on the Vadamaratchchy East coast would have collapsed. This would have threatened the entire Peninsula. The forces would have been trapped and the situation would have been very much similar to the post-Elephant Pass debacle. The damage would have been irreparable. President Rajapakse would not have survived the Vesak week massacre.

LTTE blitz

The attack on the Peninsula followed the May 11 bid to target Pearl Cruise, carrying over 700 off duty security forces personnel, returning to their bases in the Jaffna Peninsula. A successful hit would have sent the ship to the bottom of the Indian Ocean. The Mavilaaru battle dubbed the water war, artillery/mortar attack on Trincomalee Naval Dockyard (August 1), attack on Muttur (August 2-5), the second artillery barrage on Trincomalee Naval Dockyard (August 12) increased pressure on the Rajapakse administration. The security forces met the challenge head on and thwarted the enemy’s bid to bring Rajapakse to his knees.

The navy’s role should be appreciated. Due to their untiring efforts the SLN managed to inflict massive losses on Sea Tigers thereby considerably weakening the LTTE militarily.

The LTTE is believed to be facing its worst shortage of ammunition, particularly mortar and artillery rounds. This facilitated the ongoing ground operations in the Vakarai region and other parts of the north and east.

The LTTE would not be able to mount major offensives due to shrinking arsenal. The LTTE leadership is not in a position to transfer ammunition from the Vanni to the East as the Vanni units too are facing a severe shortage of ammunition.

This is an unprecedented situation. Forces are certain the LTTE is finding it extremely difficult to reinforce cadres fighting in the east where they are battling both security forces and the breakaway Karuna faction.

The SLN prevented a major LTTE attempt to replenish Vakarai on September 24. Fast Attack Craft (FACs) fought a six-hour battle off Pulmoddai to force the flotilla back.

Despite severe limitations the SLN throughout this year thwarted a series of attempts by Sea Tigers to smuggle in arms, ammunition and equipment.

Subsequent to a confrontation at 5th sand bank on October 31 the SLN recovered 27 rounds of 120mm mortars. It was the first recovery of ammunition following a confrontation this year. The SLN also recovered a large camouflage net. The trawler is believed to have carried 200 rounds of 120 mm mortars.

LTTE under pressure

The SLN destroyed several vessels carrying supplies with the destruction of a large craft over 100 nautical miles east of Kalmunai on September 17 being the biggest hit this year. However, most of the confrontations with trawlers smuggling ammunition had taken place in the Gulf of Mannar.

Due to the vigilance of the SLN, Sea Tigers had not been successful in smuggling in arms, ammunition and equipment from India. The SLN seized over 60,000 Indian manufactured detonators early this year as the result of a mid-sea confrontation.

President Rajapakse’s readiness to send his second son Yoshitha to the SLN is evidence of his support to the war effort.

Prabhakaran’s threat to intensify his struggle for a separate State in the North and East sounds hollow as the government takes the upper hand in the north east battlefields.

Let me briefly evaluate the reasons which I believe contribute to the diluting of the LTTE. Prabhakaran-Karuna split, removal of ‘Colonel’ Paduman from Trincomalee on the orders of Prabhakaran (ironically the SLAF flew Paduman from his Trincomalee base to Kilinochchi 24 hours before Karuna quit the organisation), the EU ban, US actions against LTTE agents seeking arms, Canadian ban and particularly the 9/11 Al Qaeda attack on the US which triggered worldwide condemnation of international terrorism.

A combination of local and international factors contributed towards the LTTE’s downfall. The rising international opposition to child recruitment by terrorist groups and the inclusion of the LTTE in the UN List of Shame too hastened the process. The breakaway Karuna faction too joined the notorious club recently.

The government needs to build on the current strategy of targeting the LTTE wherever possible. But it would be a mistake to lull into a false sense of security as the repercussions would be too horrific to imagine. Let me end this piece by recalling the fall of the isolated Mullaitivu army base and the SLN sub station in mid 1996 less than seven months after the fall of Jaffna. Laxity can wipe out the Rajapakse administration. -via… The Island