• The significance of the forthcoming talks in Geneva is that they offer the prospect of shift from a dead – end approach.

  • Both the government and LTTE appear resolved to be present at the talks in Geneva.

  • A devolution package that shares power between the centre and regions will do much to address the primary, or root cause of the ethnic conflict.

  • It is to be hoped that the much awaited government-UNP agreement will strengthen the ability of the government to develop such a power sharing solution.

By Jehan Perera

White flags and banners dotted different parts of the country last week at the funerals of more than two hundred service personnel killed as a result of the most recent military clashes and suicide bomb attacks. This was the worst week in terms of casualties for people living outside the north east since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement in February 2002. With these military successes the LTTE dispelled the notion that it was greatly weakened in the military confrontation with the government. The two deadly suicide attacks that took place in Habarana and Galle, well outside the north east theatre of conflict, also dispelled the notion the LTTE had been projecting internationally in the past two months that it was the victim and not an aggressor.

The LTTE attack on a naval convoy that was transiting through Habarana proved costly in terms of life with nearly one hundred unarmed sailors being killed in the deadly suicide truck attack on their buses. On the other hand, the LTTE’s suicide boat attack on the Galle harbour was warded off with minimal loss of life. But once again the costs proved to be high, as the international media described the attack as one on a tourist centre, discouraging tourists from coming to Sri Lanka even as the peak of the tourist season approaches. The LTTE’s attacks on government forces in Habarana and Galle have sent a severe warning of costs that are to come as it expands the theatre of war.

Prior to these two suicide attacks, the government may have been hopeful about its ability to restrict the war to the north east. This would have minimized the cost of the war on the Sinhalese population who live predominantly outside the north east, and who form the bedrock of the government’s electoral base. At the last presidential election, President Mahinda Rajapaksa obtained relatively few votes from the north east and other areas where the minority communities live. But he won the election with overwhelming support from the Sinhalese ethnic majority.

Very thorough security measures in Colombo that have seen massive traffic jams and midnight searches appear to have safeguarded the capital city so far. But the high cost of failure and the difficulty of being on guard against suicide attack all over the country were evident last week. While President Rajapaksa continues to retain his personal popularity, there are signs that the people are beginning to question the wisdom of the government’s approach to dealing with the LTTE. This accounts for the strong support being given by civic and religious leaders to the government’s effort to get the cooperation of the opposition UNP in addressing national issues.

Vulnerability

The failure of the government’s military offensive in Muhamalai in the north and the LTTE’s suicide attacks outside of the north east have demonstrated the vulnerability of the government’s military approach to the LTTE. The territorial and political gains made by the government in its previous military contests with the LTTE have been offset to a considerable degree by its recent reversals. The net result has been that hundreds of lives of armed personnel and civilians have been irretrievably lost, but the military and political gains have been ephemeral. The significance of the forthcoming talks in Geneva is that they offer the prospect of shift from a dead end approach.

Both the government and LTTE appear resolved to be present at the talks in Geneva. Neither wishes to be seen internationally as the party that is reluctant to talk peace and reflects the realization that the conflict in the north east is ultimately about obtaining international legitimacy and keeping it. There is undoubtedly an awareness that tactics of bombardment and civilian displacement, political assassination and child recruitment, are to the detriment of the international image of the wrong doer. But the current military approach of the two sides seems to leave them with no alternative vision of getting ahead or of problem solving.

An example would be the governmental restrictions placed on international humanitarian organizations that seek to access the north east. The public appeal made by Medicines Sans Frontiers to President Mahinda Rajapaksa to permit them to serve the civilian population of the north east is an indication of the lack of responsiveness of the government machinery to humanitarian considerations due to its military approach. The German government’s recent decision to halt new assistance programmes to the government could be the precursor to more direct international sanctions.

The LTTE’s suicide attack on the naval convoy got themselves condemnation by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and several governments. Both sides have a considerable amount of bridge building work to do, not simply with one another, but also with the international community, more so the LTTE which is designated internationally as a terrorist organisation.

Clearly, the longer term interests of the government and LTTE lie in conforming to international law and humanitarian norms. The aid donating countries of the international community have said time and again that they are ready to provide large scale financial and humanitarian assistance to Sri Lanka provided the two parties are able to take the peace process forward. What they can offer Sri Lanka far exceeds what the country can generate internally by itself at this time. The problem, however, is that both the government and LTTE appear to be primarily interested in obtaining international support or acquiescence to gain their military objectives. This clearly needs reconsideration.

Wise words
Last week Sri Lanka had the benefit of hosting three leading diplomats from three of the most influential countries in the world in relation to the Sri Lankan peace process. Jon Hanssen Bauer of Norway, Yasushi Akashi of Japan and Richard Boucher of the United States each came to Sri Lanka with a focus of assisting to find a way forward in relation to the ethnic conflict. While many in Sri Lanka would have been hoping that they came with an offer to solve the conflict to the advantage of the government, this was evidently not within their power or capacity. None of these powerful and influential countries has been able to solve the Middle East conflict or the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. But what they can do is to give us assistance if we solve our conflict.

Interestingly the common question that all three diplomats asked was what Sri Lankans would do next to solve our problem. Their own suggestion, drawing from their experiences in other parts of the world, seemed to be that Sri Lanka should develop a devolution package between the centre and the regions as the basis for any progress towards a peaceful solution. Such an analysis makes logical sense. The LTTE was born in a context in which the main democratic Tamil political parties united on a platform of separation from Sri Lanka. This was due to their experience of discrimination and lack of responsiveness of successive Sri Lankan governments to Tamil grievances and aspirations.

A devolution package that shares power between the centre and regions will do much to address the primary, or root cause of the ethnic conflict. An honourable settlement with the LTTE will become more likely in the context of a power sharing agreement. It is to be hoped that the much awaited government-UNP agreement will strengthen the ability of the government to develop such a power sharing solution.

A draft of a common position on the ethnic conflict to be agreed on by the government and UNP stated that there would be power sharing between the centre and regions, with the centre having control of certain areas of governance, while other areas would be the concern of the regions.

Both President Rajapaksa and opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe have been deservedly praised for their large hearted offer and acceptance of bipartisanship in six key areas of governance, including the ethnic conflict. So must their negotiating teams that did the spadework that comprises the areas of agreement.

The President appears keen not to alienate the nationalist Sinhalese parties even as he reaches out to the UNP for support to deal with the LTTE. If the President can achieve both of these objectives, he will have mobilized around him a Sinhalese consensus that can satisfy the demands of a just political solution that meets with Tamil and Muslim aspirations.

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